PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

Title: VIRTUAL SMART CARD DEVICE, METHOD AND SYSTEM

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FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to protecting content for transmission to a recipient, and in particular to those devices, systems and methods which protect content with a secure channel for transmission.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Digital content can easily and efficiently be delivered through any type of suitable network, such as a cable network, satellite and / or a computer network. Frequently, digital content is broadcast or multicast to many end users over the network. Optionally, digital content can also be efficiently delivered to individual users upon request.

However, in order for digital content to be effectively delivered to users in the context of usage rights or a commerce system, a number of mechanisms need to be provided. In particular, the digital content should be secure against theft, such that only authorized users can retrieve and consume the digital content. Furthermore, access to the digital content needs to be controlled, both against unauthorized use and also optionally to permit access to be linked to other mechanisms, such as payment schemes for example. Other types of control may include determination of an expiration time and date, limitations on the number of displays, and so forth. Such

control of the access to the digital content may be generally described as digital rights management.

Failure to protect "Digital Rights" is more damaging than infringement of the same rights when applied to older, "analog" content. The reason is that older forms of content storage and transmission are subject to "generational degradation", where each processing step decreases the quality of the next generation of the product. Digital systems do not, in the main, suffer from such generational degradation. Pirated content may therefore offer exactly the same quality as original material, such that unauthorized users may more effectively infringe digital rights with copied material.

The term "digital rights management" may optionally cover a multitude of rights, which are granted to authorized users. These rights are defined according to a plurality of rules, which regulate the circumstances under which a user is authorized to access the content. These rights may include viewing the content, storing the content, reproduction of the content, excerpting portions of the content, modifying the content, copyrights, access/usage rights, resell/transferring and so forth. These rights may be divided into a number of different phases including specification, packaging (binding the rights to content), delivery, and enforcement in the consumption environment.

Even an authorized user may have only a portion of these rights; for example, the user may be authorized to view and store the content, but not reproduce or modify the content.

In order to prevent unauthorized users from abusing these usage rights, and / or to prevent authorized users from unauthorized use of the rights, the digital content should be protected by some type of security mechanism. Examples of security mechanisms include, but are not limited to, encryption and scrambling of the content. US Patent Nos. 5,282,249 and 5,481,609 to Cohen et al., which are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein, disclose one exemplary system, which enables secure content to be broadcast widely, yet only to be played back or otherwise displayed by authorized users. This signal could contain a television program for example. The signal is scrambled, such that the authorized users are able to unscramble the signal and play back or otherwise display the media content only with the proper security device, such as a smart card for example. Thus, widely received media content is still protected from access by unauthorized users.

The scrambled television data streams described in US Patent Nos. 5,282,249 and 5,481,609 feature both scrambled data representing television signals and coded control messages, also known as ECMs. These ECMs contain, in a coded form, data necessary for generating a control word (CW) which may be used to descramble the scrambled data representing television signals.

While US Patent Nos. 5,282,249 and 5,481,609 describe an analog system, that is, a system in which analog television data streams are broadcast to television sets, it is appreciated that similar ECM methods may also be used for digital television data streams. Generally, the scrambling techniques used for scrambling analog television signals such as, for example, the well-known "cut-and-rotate" technique, are chosen for their particular applicability to analog signals. However,

scrambling of digital television signals preferably employs other techniques, which are well-known in the art and which are more appropriate to digital signals. One example of such a technique is the application of the well-known DES algorithm to the digital television signals.

Methods of transmitting a scrambled digital signal, including ECMs, are described in the MPEG-2 standard, ISO/IEC 13818-1, 15 April 1996 and subsequent editions.

Another attempted solution to the problem of content protection is described in published European Patent Application No. EP 0858184 and corresponding US Patent 6,178,242, which disclose a digital recording protection system and which are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. The disclosed system enables the digital content to be sent in a scrambled format, such that the digital content cannot be read and/or displayed without a key. The key is obtained from a control message, which is only sent to authorized users. Preferably, the key is obtained from coded information contained within the Entitlement Control Message, or ECM, for generating a code word associated with the ECM. Thus, only authorized users are able to correctly read and/or display the digital content.

In addition, the system and method described in European Patent Application No. EP 0858184 enable the authorized user to record and playback or otherwise display the digital content, while preventing the user from producing and distributing multiple playable copies of the digital content to other, non-authorized users. Therefore, the authorized user is able to fully use and enjoy the digital content, while the content itself is still protected from unauthorized use.

As described in European Patent Application No. EP 0858184, and as shown in background art Figure 1 taken from this Application, such a system includes a media device **100**, such as a television set, for playing the digital content, such as a television program for example. Media device **100** is connected to an integrated receiver-decoder (IRD) **110**, for receiving and decoding the scrambled digital content. The system also features a removable security element **120**, such as a smart card for example, for providing control words for unscrambling, or otherwise rendering into a clear format, the scrambled digital content by IRD **110**. In addition, the system features a digital VCR **130** for communicating with media device **100** and IRD **110**. Digital VCR **130** is able to record the digital content for later playback and/or display by media device **100**.

IRD **110** receives scrambled digital content which features a plurality of ECMs, each of which is associated with, and is typically followed by, a scrambled digital data segment, containing the actual digital content. Each ECM includes coded information which can be used to generate a code word for unscrambling the associated scrambled digital data segment. Typically, removable security element **120** generates the code word. IRD **110** is then able to descramble the scrambled digital content, for example for being played by media device **100**.

Background art Figure 2, also taken from European Patent Application No. EP 0858184, is a flow diagram illustrating the production of the scrambled digital content. As shown, the scrambled digital content is produced as an SDDS (scrambled digital data stream) **140**, featuring a plurality of ECMs such as an nth ECM **145**, and a plurality of associated SDSEGs such as an nth SDSEG (scrambled digital data

segment) **150** which is associated with nth ECM **145**. IRD **110** of Figure 1, in cooperation with removable security element **120**, is able to use SDDS **140** in order to form a recording SDDS **165**. Recording SDDS **165** is produced with the addition of a TECM (transformed ECM) key, which is permanently associated with the system of Figure 1, even if removable security element **120** is changed, replaced or exchanged, for example. This TECM key is used to make a plurality of TECMs, shown as nth TECM **175**, from the code words of the ECMs. Thus, a system which did not feature the correct TECM key could not descramble the recording SDDS **165** for playing back or otherwise displaying the digital content, while the authorized user is always able to play back or otherwise display the recorded digital content as long as the TECM key is available.

One significant difference between these types of conditional access and other currently available conditional access mechanisms, is that the latter mechanisms presently rely upon a personal key that is permanently embedded in the set-top box of the user. This key enables the set-top box to decrypt permission messages for accessing (reading and/or displaying) content. However, the key cannot be renewed or altered, since it is permanently encoded in the set-top box hardware. Therefore, it is vulnerable to "sniffing" and/or otherwise being hacked.

By contrast, the previously described mechanisms (as shown for example with regard to background art Figures 1 and 2) do not rely upon a key being permanently stored in the set-top box. Instead, the key is stored in the removable security element, such as a smart card for example. Therefore, the key is renewable, yet can be individualized to each subscriber. This smart card itself is also vulnerable to

"hacking", as for any type of digital security mechanism, but is less vulnerable than mechanisms which rely upon a permanently embedded key.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The previously described background art mechanisms are vulnerable to being hacked, although the degree and type of vulnerability may vary. At least part of their vulnerability stems from the requirement that the key for decrypting content be maintained in or near the set-top box. Even when such a key is not contained within the set-top box itself, it must be in close physical proximity to the set-top box. This proximity is both for convenience but also for security; transmitting open or unencrypted content, and/or keys to such content, over an open network is clearly undesirable. However, such at least close physical proximity also renders the storage device that contains the key more vulnerable to hacking by individual subscribers, who may then choose to use this knowledge to support unauthorized access to the content. The background art does not teach or suggest a mechanism for solving this problem. The background art also does not provide a solution which both enables the key to be stored remotely from the set-top box, while still providing a secure connection to the set-top box which must use this key in order to decrypt or otherwise access content.

The present invention, in preferred embodiments thereof, seeks to overcome these disadvantages of the background art by providing a device, system and method for secure transmission of protected content to a subscriber, without requiring a smart card or other renewable security element to be in physical proximity of the recipient

module of the subscriber, such as a set-top box for example. Instead, the protected content is transmitted securely to the subscriber through the combination of a multiple key hierarchy and a secure channel for transmission of the content. Preferably, the present invention uses a permanently stored secret at the recipient module in order to create the secure channel.

Alternatively or additionally, the present invention may also be implemented with a remote renewable security element for handling one or more renewable keys, and a permanently stored secret at the recipient module. The secret is preferably used to protect the one or more renewable keys, which in turn are used (singly or preferably as part of a multiple key hierarchy) to protect the content for transmission.

Therefore, the renewable security element may optionally be protected and controlled by the transmitter of the protected content, such as by the broadcaster for example.

Preferably, the recipient module has a secret which is embedded during manufacture, more preferably in hardware. This secret is preferably never transmitted in the clear, yet may be used as the basis for secure transmissions between the recipient module and the remote renewable security element.

The remote renewable security element may optionally store an encrypted key, which has preferably been encrypted with the secret (the remote renewable security element itself may optionally only receive the encrypted key, and may not have the secret). The secret itself is preferably unique, so that only the recipient module containing the secret can decrypt the encrypted key, and so access the protected content. This encrypted key is preferably capable of being renewed. Also, optionally

and preferably, the encrypted key that is encrypted with the secret is not used directly to access the protected content, but rather is preferably used as part of a multiple key hierarchy which ultimately enables authorized subscribers to access the protected content through the recipient module.

The remote renewable security element preferably includes an encryption mechanism for encrypting one or more keys. For a multiple key hierarchy, preferably the remote renewable security element is capable of encrypting at least one key in the hierarchy, but more preferably is capable of encrypting a plurality of such keys.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, the remote renewable security element preferably encrypts at least one key, more preferably according to at least one additional key, in order to form the key hierarchy. However, the remote renewable security element preferably passes each encrypted key that is to be sent to the recipient module, to a security server. The security server then preferably sends the encrypted keys, optionally with other data, in a message.

More preferably, the security server transmits two layers of keys in the key hierarchy, most preferably over the secure channel. The first layer concerns the type of services (accesses to protected content) to which the recipient module is entitled. The second layer provides access to particular items or portions of protected content. The keys from the first layer are preferably required in order to decrypt and use the keys in the second layer. Optionally and preferably, the first layer of keys may be protected through encryption with a subscriber key. More preferably, the secure channel may optionally be implemented by encrypting the subscriber key with the secret that is stored in the recipient module.

According to an exemplary but preferred embodiment of the security server, the security server preferably receives an encrypted access key for being packaged as a VEMM message, for the first layer of keys in the preferred multiple key hierarchy. The VEMM preferably includes a reference to access criteria to be able to locate a key for accessing content, and therefore also at least partially determines whether the recipient module is authorized to access the protected content.

Optionally and more preferably, a new and different VEMM is transmitted if the recipient module is off-line for at least a predetermined period of time, as long as the previous epoch has ended when the recipient module goes on-line again.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, there is a plurality of recipient modules, such that the VEMM is unicast to each of a subset of the plurality of recipient modules.

For the second layer of the key hierarchy, preferably an encrypted control word is prepared. The control word is preferably required for the recipient module to be able to access the protected content, and is preferably encrypted with the access key. Therefore, the encrypted control word may be described as being indirectly capable of being decrypted with the secret, since upper layer(s) of the key hierarchy is preferably required to be received and decrypted before the recipient module is able to decrypt the control word.

The security server preferably prepares a VECM with the encrypted control word and an access criteria reference. This reference enables the recipient module to determine which access key may be used to access the encrypted control word. If the recipient module is not authorized to access this particular protected content, then the

recipient module does not have the key to which the reference is being made, and so optionally does not further process the VECM. Optionally, the recipient module displays the proper error code and/or other status information if access is not authorized.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, the recipient module includes at least one permanent read-only storage medium for storing the secret, onto which the secret is more preferably burnt during manufacture. This storage medium may optionally be part of a generic set-top box chip set, which features MPEG de-multiplexing and decoding, as well as other common set-top box chip set features.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, a plurality of remote renewable security elements is preferably controlled by the broadcaster of the protected content. More preferably, the broadcaster features a head-end that includes a security server. The security server then preferably controls the plurality of remote renewable security elements.

According to other optional but preferred embodiments of the present invention, the security server and the plurality of remote renewable security elements share a server key. Transmissions between the remote renewable security elements and the security server may then optionally be encrypted with the server key, such as the access key for example.

According to other preferred embodiments of the present invention, at least one encrypted key from the multiple key hierarchy is transmitted upon receipt of a request from the recipient module. For example, the recipient module requests the

protected content from the broadcast head-end, such that the remote renewable security element receives a request for the protected content from the recipient module and prepares at least one encrypted key for transmission.

For example, if the recipient module receives a VECM with an access criteria reference that does not match a VEMM already received by the recipient module, indicating that the protected content associated with the VECM is available or is about to become available, the recipient module may optionally request the associated VEMM according to the access criteria reference. Without the VEMM, the recipient module cannot decrypt the control word to access the protected content.

Such a situation may occur, for example, according to the optional but preferred embodiment of VOD (video on demand). For this embodiment, the VEMM is preferably not sent in advance. Instead, only the VECM is sent. If the subscriber decides to access protected content associated with the VECM, then the recipient module requests a VEMM. The VEMM is preferably not prepared in advance. Instead, once the request for the VEMM is received (in the example below, by the security server), a VEMM is preferably immediately prepared and sent to the recipient module. For this embodiment, the "epoch", or time period for which the VEMM is operative, preferably starts as soon as the VEMM is prepared.

It will be appreciated that the above functions and embodiments are in no way intended to be limiting and may optionally and preferably coexist simultaneously in any appropriate configuration, including or excluding any of the above and in any combination thereof.

In addition the present invention could be implemented as software, hardware or any appropriate combination thereof. For any of these implementations, the functional stages performed by the method could be described as a plurality of logical processes implementable in any suitable programming language or any form of circuitry with such functionality.

It should be noted that the words "user" and "subscriber" are used interchangeably, except where otherwise noted.

It should be noted that the term "generic chip" may also optionally refer to a generic chip set. Furthermore, the term "generic chip" refers to any chip or set thereof capable of being manufactured according to mass-production techniques and/or to any such chip that is at least technically similar to other chips, such that preferably the only unique element is the presence of a secret. These chips are preferably commercially available chips which may optionally be based upon any set top box chip set, which are capable of decryption and of containing a secret. Preferably, the set-top box chip set features MPEG de-multiplexing and decoding, as well as other common set-top box chip set features, and the secret itself.

Hereinafter, the term "accessing content" refers to reading and/or displaying and/or playing back the content, and/or otherwise manipulating the content in some manner.

It should be noted that although the "broadcaster" may be stated to transmit the protected content and/or any type of access permission and/or key to the recipient, such as a recipient module for example, the term "broadcaster" is being used to generally describe any element of a system that transmits any type of information

and/or data to the recipient. In fact, these different elements may optionally be distributed between different entities, as described in greater detail below in the preferred embodiments of the invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The invention is herein described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a system according to the background art;

FIG. 2 is a flow diagram according to the background art;

FIG. 3 is an exemplary block diagram of a system according to the present invention;

FIG. 4 shows a portion of the system of Figure 3 in more detail, according to the present invention;

FIG. 5 shows the recipient module of Figure 3 in more detail, according to the present invention;

FIG. 6 is a flow chart of an exemplary method according to the present invention;

FIG. 7 shows an exemplary flow diagram of the operation of a preferred embodiment according to the present invention;

FIG. 8 shows an exemplary implementation of the system according to the present invention, which includes a background art implementation of the set-top box in a mixed system;

FIG. 9 shows an exemplary communication flow between the VEMM generator and the recipient module according to the present invention; and

FIG. 10 shows an exemplary virtual smart card image structure according to the present invention.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

The present invention, in preferred embodiments thereof, seeks to overcome these disadvantages of the background art by providing a device, system and method for secure transmission of protected content to a subscriber, without requiring a smart card or other renewable security element to be in physical proximity of the recipient module of the subscriber, such as a set-top box for example. Instead, the protected content is transmitted securely to the subscriber through the combination of a multiple key hierarchy and a secure channel for transmission of the content. Preferably, the present invention uses a permanently stored secret at the recipient module in order to create the secure channel.

Alternatively or additionally, the present invention may also be implemented with a remote renewable security element for handling one or more renewable keys, and a permanently stored secret at the recipient module. The secret is preferably used to protect the one or more renewable keys, which in turn are used (singly or preferably as part of a multiple key hierarchy) to protect the content for transmission.

Therefore, the renewable security element may optionally be protected and controlled by the transmitter of the protected content, such as by the broadcaster for example.

Preferably, the recipient module has a secret which is embedded during manufacture, more preferably in hardware. This secret is preferably never transmitted in the clear, yet may be used as the basis for secure transmissions between the recipient module and the remote renewable security element.

The remote renewable security element may optionally store an encrypted key, which has preferably been encrypted with the secret (the remote renewable security element itself may optionally only receive the encrypted key, and may not have the secret). The secret itself is preferably unique, so that only the recipient module containing the secret can decrypt the encrypted key, and so access the protected content. This encrypted key is preferably capable of being renewed. Also, optionally and preferably, the encrypted key that is encrypted with the secret is not used directly to access the protected content, but rather is preferably used as part of a multiple key hierarchy which ultimately enables authorized subscribers to access the protected content through the recipient module.

The remote renewable security element preferably includes an encryption mechanism for encrypting one or more keys. For a multiple key hierarchy, preferably the remote renewable security element is capable of encrypting at least one key in the hierarchy, but more preferably is capable of encrypting a plurality of such keys.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, the remote renewable security element preferably encrypts at least one key, more preferably according to at least one additional key, in order to form the key hierarchy. However, the remote renewable security element preferably passes each encrypted key that is to

be sent to the recipient module, to a security server. The security server then preferably sends the encrypted keys, optionally with other data, in a message.

More preferably, the security server transmits two layers of keys in the key hierarchy, most preferably over the secure channel. The first layer concerns the type of services (accesses to protected content) to which the recipient module is entitled. The second layer provides access to particular items or portions of protected content. The keys from the first layer are preferably required in order to decrypt and use the keys in the second layer. Optionally and preferably, the first layer of keys may be protected through encryption with a subscriber key. More preferably, the secure channel may optionally be implemented by encrypting the subscriber key with the secret that is stored in the recipient module.

According to an exemplary but preferred embodiment of the security server, the security server preferably receives an encrypted access key for being packaged as a VEMM message, for the first layer of keys in the preferred multiple key hierarchy. The VEMM preferably includes an access criteria reference and a key.

Optionally and more preferably, a new and different VEMM is transmitted if the recipient module is off-line for at least a predetermined period of time, as long as the previous epoch has ended when the recipient module goes on-line again.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, there is a plurality of recipient modules, such that the VEMM is unicast to a subset of the plurality of recipient modules.

For the second layer of the key hierarchy, preferably an encrypted control word is prepared. The control word is preferably required for the recipient module to

be able to access the protected content, and is preferably encrypted with the access key. Therefore, the encrypted control word may be described as being indirectly capable of being decrypted with the secret, since upper layer(s) of the key hierarchy is preferably required to be received and decrypted before the recipient module is able to decrypt the control word.

The security server preferably prepares a VECM with the encrypted control word and an access criteria reference. This reference enables the recipient module to determine which access key may be used to access the encrypted control word. If the recipient module is not authorized to access this particular protected content, then the recipient module does not have the key to which the reference is being made, and so optionally does not further process the VECM. Optionally, the recipient module displays the proper error code if access is not authorized.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, the recipient module includes at least one permanent read-only storage medium for storing the secret, onto which the secret is more preferably burnt during manufacture. This storage medium may optionally be part of a generic chip set, which features generic technology, apart from the secret itself.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, a plurality of remote renewable security elements is preferably controlled by the broadcaster of the protected content. More preferably, the broadcaster features a head-end that includes a security server. The security server then preferably controls the plurality of remote renewable security elements.

According to other optional but preferred embodiments of the present invention, the security server and the plurality of remote renewable security elements share a server key. Transmissions between the remote renewable security elements and the security server may then optionally be encrypted with the server key, such as the access key for example.

According to other preferred embodiments of the present invention, at least one encrypted key from the multiple key hierarchy is transmitted upon receipt of a request from the recipient module. For example, the recipient module requests the protected content from the broadcast head-end, such that the remote renewable security element receives a request for the protected content from the recipient module and prepares at least one encrypted key for transmission.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, the system described below is preferably implemented with redundant components, particularly for those components that may act as bottlenecks for further actions.

It should be noted that optionally any suitable encryption mechanism may be used for encrypting the various types of keys in the present invention, including the control word for example. Illustrative examples of such encryption mechanisms include but are not limited to, triple DES and AES.

The principles and operation of the present invention may be better understood with reference to the drawings and the accompanying description.

Reference is now made to Figure 3, showing a simplified block diagram illustration of a system **300** according to the present invention, including a recipient module **302** and a remote renewable security element **304**. Recipient module **302** is

capable of receiving protected content, as described in greater detail below, and if authorization is given, of accessing the protected content. According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, such protected content preferably comprises at least one of multimedia data, video data or audio data, or a combination thereof. Of course, any type of data may optionally be included in the protected content.

In order for authorization to be granted, so that recipient module **302** is able to access the protected content, system **300** features remote renewable security element **304**. Remote renewable security element **304** is preferably capable of storing an encrypted key, for being transmitted to recipient module **302**. This encrypted key is preferably required to be decrypted by recipient module **302**, after which recipient module **302** is preferably capable of using the key to access the protected content. Therefore, recipient module **302** preferably also features a secret, which can optionally be used at least indirectly to decrypt the encrypted key. Preferably, the encrypted key is part of a multiple key hierarchy, such that preferably a plurality of keys must be decrypted before the protected content can be accessed.

This secret is preferably unique to each recipient module **302**, and is more preferably stored on a generic chip set **306**. Most preferably, generic chip set **306** features a read-only storage medium **308** for storing the secret. Generic chip set **306** may optionally comprise a single chip; however, generic chip set **306** is preferred for storage of the secret, because generic chip set **306** may optionally be manufactured as for any other type of chip set, by only changing the secret, such that preferably only the secret is unique. Therefore, generic chip set **306** may optionally and preferably

feature generic technology, apart from the secret, thereby decreasing the cost of manufacture.

It should be noted that a similar implementation may optionally be used, without such a hardware-based storage solution, in which recipient module **302** features software for storing the secret.

Unlike the background art examples that were previously described, remote renewable security element **304** and recipient module **302** are preferably physically separated. Therefore, remote renewable security element **304** and recipient module **302** are preferably connected through a communication channel **318**, which may optionally be implemented as a cable communication link according to DOCSIS for example.

Remote renewable security element **304** also preferably comprises an encryption mechanism **310**, optionally for encrypting at least one key in the preferred key hierarchy. Although optionally remote renewable security element **304** may directly use the secret to encrypt at least one key, this option has the disadvantage of requiring the secret to be available to remote renewable security element **304**, which may not be desirable. Therefore, more preferably, encryption mechanism **310** preferably receives at least one other key with which to perform the encryption. Most preferably, remote renewable security element **304** receives the additional key twice; once as the open key, which is ready to be used for encryption; and the second time as an encrypted key, which is most preferably already encrypted with the secret.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, rather than a single key being encrypted with the secret, preferably a multiple key hierarchy is

created for accessing the protected content. For example, the multiple key hierarchy preferably contains at least two layers of keys: a first key, termed herein an access key, which may optionally determine access to a particular type of service or content; and a second key, termed herein a control word, which may optionally determine access to particular items or portions of content. In order to protect the multiple key hierarchy, optionally and preferably a secure channel is used, which may optionally be implemented with a secret stored in recipient module **302**. As described in greater detail below, the secret may optionally be used to encrypt another, more general key, which is preferably required in order to access the multiple key hierarchy that is related to content.

In order to manage the preferred key hierarchy, remote renewable security element **304** is preferably in communication with a security server **314**. Security server **314** preferably controls a plurality of remote renewable security elements **304** (not shown). An advantage of the present invention is that remote renewable security element **304** may optionally be under the direct physical control of the broadcaster through security server **314**, as shown. For this preferred implementation, remote renewable security element **304** is not necessarily implemented as a smart card. Rather, a plurality of remote renewable security elements **304** is preferably constructed as a plurality of chips on a board, or even as a plurality of software elements being operated by one or more CPU's, although the former implementation is more preferred. The plurality of remote renewable security elements **304** may also optionally be constructed as a program in a field programmable gate array (FPGA). Also, optionally and preferably, security server **314** shares a server key with all

remote renewable security elements **304** under the control of security server **314**, for secure communication between these elements.

As part of the implementation shown, recipient module **302** is not necessarily identified with a particular subscriber. Instead, the subscriber is preferably identified with a subscriber key, while recipient module **302** has the associated secret. The subscriber key may optionally be required to be renewed or changed periodically, which can optionally be performed by giving the new subscriber key to remote renewable security element **304**. Recipient module **302** is preferably able to use the secret to decrypt the subscriber key, and hence to further access the multiple key hierarchy. As previously described, this combination of secret and subscriber key is only one example of a secure channel according to the present invention.

According to optional but preferred embodiments of the present invention, the functions of remote renewable security module **304** may optionally be shared between remote renewable security module **304**, preferably implemented as a smart card chip, and a virtual smart card **311**, which is preferably implemented as software. This division is preferred because certain functions are preferably performed in hardware, both for reasons of speed and security, while other functions are more rapidly performed in software. Since security server **314** preferably controls both remote renewable security module **304** and virtual smart card **311**, certain functions may optionally be implemented in software while still maintaining overall security.

In the embodiment shown in Figure 3, security server **314** preferably receives an entitlement message from a head-end **312**, which determines the type of service(s), such as the type(s) of protected content that each subscriber, and hence recipient

module **302**, is entitled to access. In order to be able to translate the entitlement message into a message for recipient module **302**, security server **314** preferably features a VEMM generator **320**, for generating a VEMM message. The VEMM message preferably contains an access key, optionally with an access criteria reference. The optional access criteria reference preferably enables recipient module **302** to determine which access key may be matched with which type of protected content. The access key is preferably transmitted in an encrypted form, more preferably encrypted with the subscriber key.

Optionally and preferably, in order to generate the VEMM message, security server **314**, and more preferably VEMM generator **320**, receives an EMM (Entitlement Management Message) from head-end **312**. The EMM contains information that authorizes a receiver (in this example recipient module **302**) to access the protected content. For this example, the EMM is transformed into a VEMM in order for recipient module **302** to be able to access the information.

Optionally, VEMM may include a plurality of encrypted access keys and access criteria references, for example for multiple portions or items of protected content.

According to the implementation shown, VEMM generator **320** preferably sends a request, more preferably periodically, to an access key generator **322** to generate an access key. Alternatively, VEMM generator **320** may not be the master component for security server **314**. Access key generator **322** preferably encrypts the access key with the shared server key and returns the encrypted access key. Access key generator **322** also optionally and preferably stores the encrypted access key in a

database **323**, which may optionally be contained within access key generator **322** as shown, or may alternatively be located within security server **314** and accessible to other components of security server **314**. Optionally one or more components of security server **314** may retrieve the access key directly from database **323**, although as described below, alternatively the access key may be passed between these components as necessary.

VEMM generator **320** then preferably passes the encrypted access key to remote renewable security element **304**. If remote renewable security element **304** determines that recipient module **302** is entitled to the content, then remote renewable security element **304** preferably encrypts the access key with the subscriber key. Alternatively, virtual smart card **311** may determine whether recipient module **302** is entitled to the content, and may then optionally and preferably instruct remote renewable security element **304** to encrypt the access key with the subscriber key, more preferably after decrypting the access key with the shared server key.

The encrypted access key is preferably returned to VEMM generator **320**, which optionally and preferably packages the encrypted access key with the access criteria reference to form the VEMM. Optionally and more preferably, the VEMM also includes the encrypted subscriber key, which as previously described, is more preferably passed to security server **314** in an already encrypted form.

Once recipient module **302** receives the VEMM, preferably recipient module **302** decrypts the encrypted subscriber key with the secret stored in read-only storage medium **308**. Recipient module **302** then preferably decrypts the access key with the subscriber key. The VEMM also contains information about the type of service(s) to

which recipient module **302** is entitled, such as which item(s) of protected content may be accessed by recipient module **302**, according to the access criteria reference. Optionally and preferably, if recipient module **302** is not authorized for a particular service, recipient module **302** rejects the VEMM.

Security server **314**, and more preferably a VECM generator **324**, now preferably receives an ECM (Entitlement Control Message) from head-end **312**. The ECM preferably contains the necessary information to actually access a particular item or portion of content. More preferably, the ECM contains a control word that is required to access the protected content (or at least sufficient information to be able to generate such a control word), and an access criteria reference, which refers to the particular access key required to access the control word. VECM generator **324** preferably also receives the access key from access key generator **322**, and uses the access key to encrypt the control word. Alternatively and preferably, VECM generator **324** instructs remote renewable security element **304** to generate the control word from the information contained in the ECM, for example through decryption, and then to encrypt the control word with the access key.

VECM generator **324** then preferably packages the encrypted control word, optionally with the access criteria reference, into a VECM for transmission to recipient module **302**.

Security server **314** now preferably transmits the VECM to recipient module **302**. Optionally and more preferably, the VECM is multicast to a plurality of recipient modules **302** (not shown). The VECM preferably includes the encrypted control word, the access criteria reference and the crypto-period index for matching

between VECM and ECM. Recipient module **302** decrypts the encrypted control word, and preferably uses the control word to access the protected content. The access criteria reference contains the necessary information for recipient module **302** to be able to determine which access key is required for decrypting the encrypted control word.

Security server **314** may optionally be contained within head-end **312**, or alternatively may be implemented as two separate entities, as shown. Regardless of the relative locations, the implementation shown in Figure 3 has a number of advantages. For example, if security server **314** is stolen or otherwise compromised, recovery may be performed relatively quickly. Similarly, remote renewable security module **304** itself is much more difficult to steal or otherwise compromise, but if such an act were to occur, recovery can be performed more quickly and efficiently.

According to preferred embodiments of the present invention, as explained in greater detail below with regard to Figure 6, the protected content is preferably transmitted to recipient module **302** by head-end **312** with the ECM, through the same broadcast channel (shown as a broadcast channel **326**). The ECM is preferably sent to recipient module **302** in order to comply with the requirements of standards such as MPEG (Motion Picture Expert Group) protocols, which require the ECM to be sent with the content itself. For the preferred implementation of recipient module **302** in which it lacks a smart card as shown, recipient module **302** would not be able to access at least a portion of the information in the ECM.

Figure 4 shows head-end **312** in greater detail, with regard to the interactions with security server **314**. As shown, head-end **312** optionally and preferably features

a subscriber management system (SMS) **400**, for managing the entitlements of each subscriber. These entitlements preferably determine which type(s) of content may be accessed by each subscriber. SMS **400** may also preferably manage subscription and other charges and payments.

SMS **400** then preferably communicates with an EMM generator **402**, for generating EMM messages. As previously described, these messages include information about the content to which the subscriber may be given access, and are sent to VEMM generator **320** at security server **314**. As previously described, ECM messages are preferably generated by an ECM generator **404** and are preferably sent to VECM generator **324**. Each ECM message preferably includes a control word, or at least sufficient information to be able to generate the control word (for example by decryption) and also the access criteria reference, and optionally the cryptographic period (crypto-period) for which the ECM is valid. The crypto-period information is preferably present for matching the ECM to the VECM.

Since EMM messages preferably include an access criteria reference, head-end **312** also preferably includes an access criteria generator **406**. Access criteria generator **406** preferably generates both the access criteria for the protected content, and the associated access criteria reference.

These portions of head-end **312** are preferably in communication with security server **314** through a local network **408**, and in any case, may optionally be implemented according to the background art.

Figure 5 shows recipient module **302** in greater detail. As shown, recipient module **302** also optionally and preferably features a set-top box **500**, and a client

interface **502**. Client interface **502** preferably provides at least some of the functionality for communication with system **300**, which had previously been provided by the smart card itself in the background art.

The above-referenced description is preferably operable for two different situations, which may be termed "key-push" and "key-pull". For example, if system **300** is being used for distributing multimedia data, such as a television program for example, then recipient module **302** may optionally be offered access to the protected content, without first requesting such access. This offer is an example of "key-push", and may occur because of the scheduling of a television program for broadcast. The offer would enable recipient module **302** to be able to receive the broadcast program.

However, for pay-per-view or video-on-demand (both of which are examples of "key-pull"), in which the subscriber places a request for the television program through recipient module **302**, optionally and preferably client interface **502** receives a description of one or more choices of content that are available. The subscriber then optionally selects one of the choices of content. Client interface **502** then preferably queries security server **314** (not shown; see Figure 3) for purchase options. Security server **314** may optionally transfer the query to head-end **312** (not shown; see Figure 3), but in any case preferably transmits the options to client interface **502**. Client interface **502** preferably then requests one of these options, after which the process is performed substantially as described with regard to Figure 3 above.

This embodiment may also optionally be implemented with FECM messages, which are "future" ECM messages. Preferably, the FECM does not contain the control word, or information sufficient to generate the control word, but rather

provides sufficient information (such as the access criteria reference for example) to allow client interface **502** to order the associated protected content from security server **314**.

A further optional but preferred embodiment of the present invention is for "polite push". According to this embodiment, recipient module **302** may optionally transmit at least one request for protected content to security server **314**, after which further communication is "pushed" to recipient module **302**.

Figure 6 shows a flowchart of an exemplary method according to the present invention. In stage 1, the recipient module, which optionally and preferably is a set-top box, is manufactured with a secret. The secret is preferably unique. Preferably, the secret is embedded in the hardware as previously described. More preferably, the set-top box is manufactured with generic technology as previously described, apart from the secret itself. Also more preferably, the set-top box receives an identifier. Optionally and more preferably, the head-end (or any other controlling unit) receives the secret. However, the secret is preferably never transmitted otherwise, to other components of the system.

Also optionally and preferably, during the manufacturing process or after, a subscriber key is created, which may optionally be a temporary subscriber key. This key is preferably encrypted with the secret. Also optionally and preferably, if the set-top box is to be controlled by a remote smart card that is part of a cluster controlled by a security server, then the subscriber key is preferably also encrypted with the shared server key. Both of these encrypted keys are preferably sent to the EMM generator.

In stage 2, the set-top box preferably registers itself with the security server. The security server then requests the encrypted subscriber key from the EMM generator. The registration is preferably reported to the subscriber management system.

In stage 3, the subscriber management system communicates with the EMM generator in order to manage the entitlements of the subscriber (the protected content to which the subscriber may be granted access). The EMM generator then creates the necessary EMM messages for updating the entitlements of the subscriber.

In stage 4, the EMM messages are received by the remote smart card that communicates with the set-top box. As previously described, the remote smart card is controlled by the security server.

In stage 5, for each item of protected content, preferably access criteria are defined, optionally by the access criteria manager (as shown with regard to Figure 4). These access criteria may optionally be global (for example, related to geographical area, etc) or alternatively may be specific to a particular set-top box (for example, proof of purchase by the subscriber for particular content, such as pay-per-view for example). Each access criterion preferably has an associated access criteria reference. The access criteria reference and the access criteria are then preferably sent to the security server.

In stage 6, the security server preferably creates an access key, as described with regard to Figure 3 in more detail. Each access key is preferably encrypted with the shared server key. More preferably, each access key is associated with one or more access criteria references. Most preferably, each access key is associated with a

specific access criteria reference, and may therefore optionally be indexed by the access criteria reference for storage and retrieval.

In stage 7, the security server compares the entitlements of the subscriber to the available content. The latter is preferably determined according to the plurality of access criteria, while the former is preferably obtained from the subscriber management system. If the subscriber is entitled to particular protected content, then the encrypted access key (encrypted with the subscriber key) is obtained. In addition, the security server preferably prepares a VEMM as previously described.

In stage 8, the protected content itself is preferably generated by protecting content with a control word. The control word is preferably generated by the control word generator at the head-end, as described with regard to Figure 4. Protecting the content preferably involves encrypting the content with the control word, although alternatively, other types of protection may optionally be contemplated.

In stage 9, the ECM generator preferably generates the ECM with the access criteria reference and the crypto-period index. The ECM and control word are then sent to the security server.

In stage 10, the security server preferably encrypts the control word with the access key, and then generates the VECM from the ECM and the encrypted control word. The VECM also preferably contains the crypto-period index, in order to be able to match the ECM to the VECM.

In stage 11, the VECM is transmitted to the set-top box. The set-top box then preferably decrypts the access key with the subscriber key; the subscriber key itself is preferably previously decrypted with the secret. The set-top box then preferably uses

the access key to decrypt the control word, after which the set-top box may access the protected content.

In stage 12, protected content is transmitted to the set-top box, optionally with the ECM. The protected content may optionally be sent by the same channel as the VECM, but preferably is sent by a different channel. More preferably, the ECM is sent through the same channel as the protected content. The ECM is preferably sent to the set-top box in order to comply with the requirements of standards such as MPEG (Motion Picture Expert Group) protocols, which require the ECM to be sent with the content itself. For the preferred implementation of the set-top box in which it lacks a smart card, the set-top box would not be able to access at least a portion of the information in the ECM.

Figure 7 shows an exemplary flow diagram of the operation of a preferred embodiment according to the present invention. At the top of the diagram, six different locations are given at which one or more actions may occur. These may include, as shown, the "factory" (where the recipient module, such as a set-top box, is manufactured); the central HE (head-end); the security server, labeled as "VGVS"; the smart card chip, labeled as "SCC"; and the recipient module, shown as two separate components, the verifier and the decoder, for the purposes of explanation only and without any intention of being limiting. Arrows show the flow of operations between locations, and are given in sequential order of the operations as they are performed. Each arrow is labeled with a number and described in greater detail below.

Arrow 1 shows the secret (Kb) and optionally an identifier for the recipient module (S) being installed at the factory into the decoder portion of the recipient module. The decoder actually decrypts keys and accesses the protected content.

Arrow 2 indicates that the security server is provided with a subscriber key (Ks), encrypted with the secret to form an encrypted subscriber key. Optionally, the security server is provided with a second encrypted subscriber key, which has been encrypted with a known key to the server, thereby enabling the security server to obtain an unencrypted subscriber key. The known key may optionally be shared between the factory and all of the smart card chips (Kf). Also optionally, the security server receives the identifier of the recipient module.

Arrows 3 and 4 are preferably performed once per "epoch", a predetermined period of time which may optionally and preferably be a day or a portion thereof. Arrow 3 shows the security server sending a request to the smart card chip, to create an access key (Ka). Arrow 4 shows the smart card chip sending the access key back to the security server, preferably encrypted with a key (Kv) that is shared between all of the smart card chips controlled by the security server. Optionally and more preferably, arrows 3 and 4 are repeated for each set of access criteria, according to an access criteria reference.

The processes shown with regard to arrows 3 and 4 optionally and preferably include communication between the smart card chip and the virtual smart card (not shown; see Figure 3). The virtual smart card optionally sends a request to the smart card chip, to generate the access key (Ka). The smart card chip then generates the

access key, and preferably encrypts it with the shared key Kv. This encrypted access key is then returned to the virtual smart card, which passes it to the security server.

Arrows 5, 6, 7 and 8 are also preferably performed once per "epoch", for each subscriber (client). Before arrow 5, as indicated the security server checks the entitlement of the subscriber for particular type(s) of content. As arrow 5 shows, the security server then sends the access key (Ka), again preferably encrypted with the shared key Kv, and the subscriber key (Ks), preferably encrypted with the shared factory key (Kf), to the smart card chip. The smart card chip then returns Ka encrypted with Ks to the security server, in arrow 6. In arrow 7, the security server creates a VEMM, containing an access criteria reference and an encrypted access key (Ka encrypted with Ks) for each portion or item of protected content for which the recipient module is entitled to access. The security server also preferably sends Ks encrypted with Kb as part of the VEMM. In arrow 8, the verifier disassembles the VEMM, and sends Ks encrypted with Kb to the decoder.

Arrows 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 are preferably performed once per cryptographic period, which may optionally be in the order of seconds or minutes, etc. In arrow 9, the head-end sends an ECM, containing the access criteria reference and the cryptographic period index (crypto-period index), to the security server. The ECM also contains the control word (CW), which is necessary for accessing the protected content that is being transmitted by the head-end. In arrow 10, the security server sends the ECM with the access key (Ka), preferably encrypted with Kv, to the smart card chip. In arrow 11, the smart card chip returns the control word, preferably encrypted with the access key (CW encrypted with Ka), to the security server.

These processes may also optionally be performed with communication between the virtual smart card and the smart card chip as follows. The virtual smart card preferably receives the ECM from the security server, and passes the ECM, optionally with the encrypted access key, to the smart card chip. Since the smart card chip originally generated the access key in this embodiment, optionally only the ECM is sent to the smart card chip. The smart card chip then preferably returns the encrypted control word, encrypted with the access key, to the virtual smart card.

Alternatively and more preferably, the virtual smart card selects a random number to be the encrypted access key. This random number is then sent to the smart card chip, which more preferably performs the decryption process on the random number with the shared key Kv. Since the process of encrypting a random number typically yields another random number, the smart card chip is able to derive a random number that can be used as the access key, even if the smart card chip did not originally generate the access key. The derived random number is then preferably used as the access key to encrypt the control word.

In arrow 12, the security server prepares a VECM, containing the encrypted control word, the access criteria reference and the crypto-period index, for being sent to the verifier. In arrow 13, the verifier sends the previously received encrypted access key and the encrypted control word to the decoder.

Figure 8 shows an optional but preferred implementation of system **300**, in which background art implementations of the set-top box are present in a mixed system, with recipient module **302** and other components from Figure 3. Unless

otherwise indicated, all components that have the same reference numbers as for Figure 3 have identical functions.

As shown, system **300** now also features a background art set-top box **800**, with a background art smart-card **802** that is preferably located at the same physical location. For example, smart-card **802** may optionally be inserted into a slot in set-top box **800**. Set-top box **800** is preferably directly connected to local network **408** in order to receive the EMM from EMM generator **402**. Smart-card **802** is then preferably able to process the EMM, to determine whether the subscriber is entitled to the content to which the EMM refers, and also to receive the access key.

Both set-top box **800** and recipient module **302** preferably also receive the ECM from the head-end broadcasting component (not shown), which may optionally be some type of MUX (multiplexer). More preferably, the ECM is received with the broadcast protected content.

One advantage of such a mixed system is that legacy (background art) set-top boxes **800** may optionally be used in conjunction with recipient module **302**, such that previously installed set-top boxes **800** would not necessarily need to be removed.

Figure 9 shows an exemplary communication flow between the VEMM generator (VEMMG) and the recipient module (STB) according to the present invention. As shown, preferably the recipient module sends a request for registration, which may optionally be broadcast (arrow 1). Next, the VEMM generator responds by acknowledging the registration (arrow 2).

The recipient module then optionally sends a request for a reference to one or more access criteria (arrow 3). The VEMM generator responds by sending an

updated VEMM (arrow 4) or a new VEMM (arrow 5). Alternatively, the VEMM generator may send the VEMM without the request from the recipient module.

The recipient module then optionally and preferably requests a purchase offer, as shown in arrow 6. The purchase offer is sent from the VEMM generator to the recipient module (arrow 7), which may optionally respond with a purchase request (arrow 8). The purchase is then preferably acknowledged by the VEMM generator (arrow 9).

For IPPV (impulse pay per view), the recipient module preferably requests the content by sending the access criteria reference for the content, for example, from an ECM which may have been broadcast by the head-end (arrow 10). The VEMM generator then responds with the appropriate VEMM, which contains the encrypted access key, if the recipient module is entitled to receive the content (arrow 11).

Figure 10 shows an exemplary smart card image structure according to the present invention. The smart card image optionally and preferably determines the subscriber information that is provided to the virtual smart card for determining entitlements. Preferably, the image is stored on the smart card chip or other remote renewable security element. As shown, the virtual smart card preferably has a number of functions for altering information on the smart card image, including a function **1000** for saving the smart card image; a function **1002** for receiving the purchase order, a function **1004** for purchasing the content and a function **1006** which indicates that the content has been viewed, or otherwise used by the subscriber.

A smart card image **1008** may optionally contain such information as a smart card identifier **1010**, a service map **1012** (which optionally and preferably indicates

which services, such as which channels for example, the subscriber is entitled to receive), one or more types of information for indicating the subscriber location (shown as a zipcode **1014** and a RegionBits **1016** as non-limiting examples), and information about the subscriber **1018**. Smart card image **1008** preferably contains information about keys **1020**.

Optionally and preferably, smart card image **1008** also contains one or more SeriesSlots **1022**, which is a wallet for optionally purchasing PPV (pay per view) items, and one or more OPPV slots **1024**, related to the purchase of pay per view content items in advance.

The information for smart card image **1008** is preferably prepared when the SMS sends information about the subscriber to the EMM generator. The EMM generator then preferably translates this information into the data required for smart card image **1008**.

While the invention has been described with respect to a limited number of embodiments, it will be appreciated that many variations, modifications and other applications of the invention may be made.